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LAWYERS AND THE 
SECRET WELFARE STATE 
Milan Markovic* 
INTRODUCTION 
The United States assists its less fortunate citizens through a wide variety 
of federal and state programs.1  However, public assistance is far more 
extensive in other developed countries.2  To receive welfare benefits, U.S. 
citizens must meet stringent eligibility requirements3 and work thirty hours 
a week or engage in community service.4  Despite the passage of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act5 (PPACA or “the Affordable Care 
Act”), Americans do not have national health insurance.6  Few Americans 
 
*  Associate Professor of Law, Texas A&M University School of Law.  This Article is part 
of a larger colloquium entitled Lawyering in the Regulatory State held at Fordham 
University School of Law.  For an overview of the colloquium, see Nancy J. Moore, 
Foreword:  Lawyering in the Regulatory State, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1811 (2016). 
 
 1. IRWIN GARFINKEL ET AL., WEALTH & WELFARE STATES:  IS AMERICA A LAGGARD OR 
LEADER? 2 (2010). 
 2. See MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE PRICE OF CITIZENSHIP 15 (2001) (“The American welfare 
state . . . stands out for what it lacks.”); see also GARFINKEL, supra note 1, at 107 (“[The 
United States] has also consistently lagged behind other rich nations in providing cash and 
social insurance benefits.”). 
 3. Welfare in the United States is a federal program that is administered by the states 
pursuant to the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families program. See Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 
§ 402(a)(1)(A), 110 Stat. 2105, 2113–14 (1996).  Most states require individuals to be well 
below the federal poverty level to collect benefits. See generally GENE FALK, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE FOR NEEDY FAMILIES (TANF):  ELIGIBILITY AND 
BENEFITS AMOUNTS IN STATE TANF CASH ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS summary (2014), 
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43634.pdf (“In July 2012, the majority of states . . . required that 
a single mother caring for two children earn less than $795 per month to gain entry to the 
benefit rolls—an earnings level representing about half of 2012 poverty-level income.”) 
[http://perma.cc/4CFT-W8DU]. 
 4. See Sylvia A. Law, Ending Welfare As We Know It, 49 STAN. L. REV. 471, 489 
(1997).  There is an exception for single parents with children six years of age or younger. 
Id. 
 5. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). 
 6. The Affordable Care Act allows millions of Americans who were previously unable 
to acquire health insurance to purchase it but will still leave millions without coverage. See 
id.; Norman Daniels, The Ethics of Health Reform:  Why We Should Care About Who Is 
Missing Coverage, 44 CONN. L. REV. 1057, 1065–67 (2012).  This problem has been 
exacerbated by states’ refusal to participate in the Medicaid expansion. See Emily Whalen 
Parento & Lawrence O. Gostin, Better Health, but Less Justice:  Widening Health 
Disparities After National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 27 NOTRE DAME 
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 481, 502 (2013) (observing that in many states persons with 
income between 100 percent and 133 percent of the federal poverty line are eligible for 
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are able to claim paid family or medical leave, and some employers do not 
even provide unpaid leave.7  Because of the limited nature of its public 
benefits regime, prominent commentators have characterized the United 
States as a “semi-welfare state.”8 
The semi-welfare state will likely persist.  Americans have traditionally 
viewed entitlement programs as a discouragement to work.9  Most existing 
federal programs were established to insure workers from risks such as 
disability and unemployment, not out of a sense of societal obligation to the 
needy.10 
Notwithstanding the ambivalence toward “entitlements,” the United 
States devotes a substantial portion of its budget toward various forms of 
public assistance.  In 2014, the United States spent $851 billion in 
providing benefits to the elderly and disabled through the Social Security 
Program11 and $836 billion on healthcare through Medicare, Medicaid, the 
Children’s Health Insurance Program, and PPACA.12 
In addition to direct expenditures, the federal government uses tax policy 
to incentivize the private sector to improve social welfare.13  Political 
scientist Christopher Howard has argued that the United States maintains a 
“hidden welfare state” through its granting of tax deductions to individuals 
and businesses that engage in publicly beneficial activities.14  However, the 
hidden welfare state predominately serves groups other than the poor.15 
 
subsidies to enable them to purchase insurance, but those below the poverty line are not and 
will be unable to purchase insurance); see also Lawrence O. Gostin et al., Restoring Health 
to Health Reform:  Integrating Medicine and Public Health to Advance the Population’s 
Well-Being, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1777, 1780 n.6 (2011) (describing PPACA as, “at best, an 
incremental advance in changing the way health care is organized, financed, and delivered”). 
 7. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(c) (2012) (requiring covered employers to provide only twelve 
weeks of unpaid leave); see also Julie C. Suk, Are Gender Stereotypes Bad for Women?:  
Rethinking Antidiscrimination Law and Work-Family Conflict, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 4 
(2010) (“[T]he United States stands virtually alone in not providing women a legal guarantee 
of paid leave from work after the birth of a child.”). 
 8. KATZ, supra note 2, at 15 (“America has what I have called a ‘semi-welfare state’; 
others have referred to it as incomplete or truncated or have called America a welfare 
haggard.”).  The term “welfare state” connotes programs “designed to assure economic 
security to all citizens by guaranteeing the fundamental necessities of life.” Id. at 9. 
 9. See Sandra R. Levitsky, “What Rights?”:  The Construction of Political Claims to 
American Health Care Entitlements, 42 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 551, 552 (2008). 
 10. See id.; see also William H. Simon, Rights and Redistribution in the Welfare System, 
38 STAN. L. REV. 1431, 1432 (1986) (noting the disassociation between welfare rights and 
redistribution). 
 11. CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, POLICY BASICS:  WHERE DO OUR FEDERAL 
TAX DOLLARS GO? 1 (2015), http://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/4-14-08tax 
.pdf [http://perma.cc/752D-GH5T]. 
 12. Id. 
 13. See CHRISTOPHER HOWARD, THE HIDDEN WELFARE STATE 3 (1997). 
 14. See id. 
 15. See id. at 33 (“[T]he visible welfare state serves a far greater proportion of 
individuals below the poverty line, and below the median income, than does the hidden 
welfare state.”); see also GARFINKEL, supra note 1, at 40 (“Tax expenditures (savings in 
income tax payments) . . . [are an] alternative (and . . . less progressive) way[] to achieve 
some of the social goals of direct government spending—among them, providing health 
insurance, housing, or income security in old age.”). 
2016] LAWYERS AND THE SECRET WELFARE STATE 1847 
This Article suggests that the United States also maintains a secret 
welfare state.  The secret welfare state exists because of lawyers’ ubiquitous 
use of questionable practices in representing clients before benefit-granting 
government agencies, which enable thousands of individuals to collect 
public benefits who may not qualify for them.16  This Article focuses in 
particular on lawyers’ handling of evidence of nondisability in Social 
Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) proceedings and participation in 
Medicaid planning.  Although lawyers’ conduct in seeking to minimize 
their clients’ tax obligations has received substantial scrutiny,17 lawyers’ 
conduct in asserting claims to public benefits has not. 
The SSDI and Medicaid processes are structured as nonadversarial.  
Lawyers nevertheless appear to have institutionalized the nondisclosure of 
adverse information in SSDI proceedings and financial impoverishment 
techniques for Medicaid applications such that their clients are able to 
circumvent eligibility criteria with little risk of detection. 
These tactics may not be unethical in some cases.  Assessing the extent 
of a client’s disability or financial status is difficult, and lawyers are 
expected to present claims in a favorable light.18  Moreover, efforts to 
require attorneys to disclose adverse medical evidence in SSDI proceedings 
and to prohibit Medicaid planning have failed, reflecting a tacit acceptance 
of the secret welfare state and lawyers’ maintenance thereof. 
Nevertheless, lawyers’ use of these tactics is not mandated by ethics rules 
and has harmful consequences.  The funding for SSDI and Medicaid is 
limited.  In assisting relatively advantaged individuals to obtain SSDI, 
Medicaid, and other public benefits programs, lawyers may be jeopardizing 
these programs’ sustainability and the welfare of those who depend upon 
them. 
Part I of this Article briefly introduces the SSDI and Medicaid regimes 
and lawyers’ roles therein.  SSDI hearings before the Office of Disability 
Adjudication and Review (ODAR) are ex parte, and ethics rules and SSA 
 
 16. Although this Article focuses on the role of attorneys in Social Security Disability 
proceedings and Medicaid, nonlawyers frequently appear in disability proceedings. See 20 
C.F.R. § 404.1705(b) (2015) (allowing a claimant to “appoint any person who is not an 
attorney to be [his or her] representative in dealings” with the Social Security 
Administration); see also Drew A. Swank, Non-Attorney Social Security Disability 
Representatives and the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 36 S. ILL. U. L.J. 223, 234–35 (2012) 
(“Non-attorneys represent claimants ranging from eleven to fourteen percent of the more 
than 700,000 cases heard by the Social Security Administration each year.” (footnotes 
omitted)).  Some jurisdictions allow nonlawyers to engage in Medicaid planning whereas 
others do not. Compare Bd. on the Unauthorized Practice of Law of the Supreme Court of 
Ohio, Advisory Op. UPL 11-01 (2011), https://www.sconet.state.oh.us/Boards/UPL/advisory 
_opinions/UPLAdvOp_11_01.pdf (discussing Medicaid assistance and planning by 
nonattorneys) [http://perma.cc/Y9TX-STH5], with Fla. Bar, Advisory Op., 40 Fla. L. 
Weekly S14 (2015) (same). 
 17. See, e.g., Michael Hatfield, Tax Lawyers, Tax Defiance, and the Ethics of Casual 
Conversation, 10 FLA. TAX REV. 841 (2011); Loren D. Prescott Jr., Challenging the 
Adversarial Approach to Taxpayer Representation, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 693 (1997). 
 18. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.3 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013); see also 
id. r. 3.1 cmt. 1 (“The advocate has a duty to use legal procedure for the fullest benefit of the 
client’s cause . . . .”). 
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regulations would seem to require the disclosure of material information.19  
Nevertheless, the organized bar historically has resisted disclosing adverse 
evidence, especially adverse medical evidence, to ODAR judges.20  
Consequently, ODAR judges are often unable to decide disability cases on 
their merits.21 
In terms of Medicaid, lawyers advise various financial impoverishment 
techniques to allow their clients to meet Medicaid’s stringent income and 
asset eligibility requirements.  These practices, known collectively as 
“Medicaid planning,” can range from relatively uncontroversial tactics, 
such as transferring assets to third parties in order to make the transferor 
appear financially impoverished, to more questionable tactics, such as 
transferring assets to third parties that serve no purpose other than 
impoverishing the transferor and even “Medicaid divorce.”22  A federal law 
that prohibited Medicaid planning was held unconstitutional after a 
challenge by the New York State Bar.23 
Part II scrutinizes whether failing to disclose adverse medical evidence 
and engaging in Medicaid planning can be justified ethically.  Although 
nondisclosure of adverse information and participation in Medicaid 
planning may be justified in individual cases, their pervasiveness 
undermines SSDI and Medicaid and harms future beneficiaries as well as 
those with bona fide claims who might not have the means or sophistication 
to consult with SSDI and Medicaid attorneys.  The existence of a secret 
welfare state that can be accessed by those who are neither disabled nor 
poor also diminishes public support for expanding public benefits 
programs. 
Part III suggests that, rather than perceiving benefit-granting agencies as 
adversaries to be outflanked, attorneys could serve as gatekeepers of the 
public benefits regime.24  This model of lawyering has been embraced by 
the tax bar and other segments of the legal profession and is necessary to 
 
 19. See id. r. 3.3(d); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1740(b)(1). 
 20. See Robert E. Rains, Professional Responsibility and Social Security 
Representation:  The Myth of the State-Bar Bar to Compliance with Federal Rules on 
Production of Adverse Evidence, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 363, 391–92 (2007) (detailing the 
American Bar Association’s opposition to ethical reforms that would have mandated 
disclosure of adverse evidence in Social Security Disability proceedings). 
 21. See Drew A. Swank, Money for Nothing:  Five Small Steps to Begin the Long 
Journey of Restoring Integrity to the Social Security Administration’s Disability Programs, 
41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 155, 174 (2012). 
 22. See John A. Miller, Voluntary Impoverishment to Obtain Government Benefits, 13 
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 81, 91–97 (2003). 
 23. See N.Y. State Bar Ass’n v. Reno, 999 F. Supp. 710, 712 (N.D.N.Y. 1998) 
(enjoining enforcement).  For a concise history, see Lisa Schreiber Joire, Note, After New 
York State Bar Association v. Reno:  Ethical Problems in Limiting Medicaid Estate 
Planning, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 789, 801–04 (1999). 
 24. Gatekeepers are “parties who are able to disrupt misconduct by withholding their 
cooperation from wrongdoers.” Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers:  The Anatomy of a 
Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53, 53 (1986); see also Ronald J. 
Gilson, The Devolution of the Legal Profession:  A Demand Side Perspective, 49 MD. L. 
REV. 869, 872 (1990) (suggesting that attorneys function as gatekeepers by acting as an ex 
ante screen). 
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ensure the sustainability of SSDI, Medicaid, and other benefits programs 
because of the limited capacity of the federal government to enforce 
eligibility criteria. 
This Article concludes by calling for additional research on the role of 
lawyers in the American welfare state.  In particular, it may be possible that 
the legal profession’s central role in the distribution of public benefits is an 
obstacle to a fairer and more transparent social safety net. 
I.  LAWYERING IN THE U.S. WELFARE STATE 
Lawyers represent clients before numerous state and federal agencies that 
administer public benefits.  Attorneys’ actions determine not only whether 
individual claimants will receive benefits, but also whether these programs 
are serving their intended beneficiaries. 
With respect to SSDI and Medicaid, the institutionalization of certain 
questionable ethical practices likely allows thousands of Americans who do 
not meet eligibility criteria to qualify for these programs.  Although the 
nondisclosure of adverse information in SSDI proceedings and participation 
in Medicaid planning can be justified ethically in some circumstances, 
lawyers have significantly altered the nature of these important entitlement 
programs. 
A.  SSDI Lawyers and the 
Nondisclosure of Adverse Evidence 
SSDI provides cash benefits to individuals who cannot continue to work 
because of severe, long-term medical impairments.25  The United States 
paid out approximately $141 billion to SSDI recipients and their families in 
2014—an amount that equates to approximately four percent of the federal 
budget.26 
The SSDI process generally proceeds as follows.  To claim benefits, 
individuals must first file applications with the Social Security 
Administration (SSA) that detail their work and medical histories.27  
Federally funded state agencies known as disability determination services 
(DDS) process the applications.28  To determine qualification for SSDI, 
DDS examiners compare claimants’ medical impairments against the SSA’s 
listing of impairments.29 
 
 25. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505 (2015). 
 26. See CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, CHART BOOK:  SOCIAL SECURITY 
DISABILITY INSURANCE 1 (2015), http://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/7-21-
14socsec-chartbook.pdf [http://perma.cc/LP7X-N7DN].  The average cash award was 
$1129.61 for a disabled worker in March 2013. See WILLIAM R. MORTON, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY INSURANCE (SSDI) REFORM:  AN OVERVIEW OF 
PROPOSALS TO REDUCE THE GROWTH IN SSDI ROLLS 3 (2013), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/ 
R43054.pdf [http://perma.cc/LT5M-LNVG]. 
 27. See MORTON, supra note 26, at 3. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
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If DDS denies a claim, the claimant may seek reconsideration and then 
appeal to ODAR.30  At the ODAR stage, claimants receive hearings before 
ODAR judges who review claims de novo.31  In rare cases, claimants who 
do not prevail in their hearings appeal to the SSA’s Appeals Council and 
file suit in federal court.32  Attorneys are involved in all stages of the SSDI 
process, but as a practical matter, attorneys have limited ability to influence 
the outcome of claims outside of ODAR hearings.33 
More than 1300 ODAR judges decide approximately 700,000 claims a 
year.34  Each ODAR judge typically hears thirty to forty cases a month.35  
The hearings are generally short and feature few witnesses.36  The SSA is 
not represented, and ODAR judges conduct hearings in a nonadversarial 
manner.37  Cases are decided based on the materials contained in the DDS 
files as well as any new materials submitted by claimants and their 
attorneys.38 
Ethical rules and ODAR regulations would seem to require that attorneys 
disclose adverse evidence, including adverse medical evidence.  Rule 3.3(d) 
of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct requires attorneys in ex parte 
proceedings to “inform the tribunal of all material facts known to the lawyer 
that will enable the tribunal to make an informed decision, whether or not 
the facts are adverse.”39  One state bar has specifically held that Rule 3.3(d) 
applies to SSDI proceedings.40 
 
 30. Id. at 4. 
 31. See Rains, supra note 20, at 369. 
 32. One practitioner has described the Appeals Council as “Kafkaesque[:] . . .  remote 
and inscrutable and plagued by inexplicable delays. . . .  For most claimants, the Appeals 
Council is nothing more than a huge obstacle in the path to a federal court appeal.” CHARLES 
T. HALL, SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY PRACTICE § 4:4, Westlaw (database updated Aug. 
2015). 
 33. Id. § 1:5. 
 34. See Hearings and Appeals, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., http://ssa.gov/appeals/about_ 
odar.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2016) [http://perma.cc/XDL4-66EM].  Of course, the SSA, 
as a whole, processes millions more annually. See Jon C. Dubin, The Labor Market Side of 
Disability-Benefits Policy and Law, 20 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 1, 5 (2011). 
 35. See HALL, supra note 32, § 3:1. 
 36. Id. § 3:28. 
 37. See Swank, supra 21, at 170.  ODAR judges are employees of the SSA but, as the 
Supreme Court has ruled, do not function as advocates or adversaries. See Richardson v. 
Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 410 (1971) (“The social security hearing examiner, furthermore, does 
not act as counsel.  He acts as an examiner charged with developing the facts.”); see also 
Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 110–11 (2000) (describing SSDI proceedings as 
“inquisitorial”). 
 38. See Rains, supra note 20, at 370.  ODAR judges are able to call the SSA’s medical 
and vocational experts to testify, but few do so because of caseload pressure and budgetary 
constraints. See Frank S. Bloch, The Role of Medical Personnel in the Social Security 
Administration’s Disability Determination and Appeals Process:  Some Proposals for 
Reform, 15 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 91, 93 (1991); cf. Swank, supra note 
21, at 169 (arguing that eliminating the SSA’s large backlog of cases is its overriding 
priority).  Even when these experts do appear, they opine only on the evidence contained in 
the record and do not conduct their own analyses. See Bloch, supra, at 93–94. 
 39. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013). 
 40. See Ala. State Bar Ass’n Disciplinary Comm’n, Formal Op. 1993-06 (1993). But see 
N.C. State Bar, 98 Formal Ethics Op. 1 (1999) (claiming that SSDI proceedings are not ex 
parte because ODAR judges can develop the record).  As Professor Robert Rains notes, the 
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In addition, SSA regulations long required claimants to produce evidence 
that is “material” to the disability determination, and the regulations were 
recently amended to require the production of evidence that “relates” to the 
determination.41  Lawyers are also obligated “to assist the claimant in 
furnishing medical evidence that . . . [the SSA] can use to reach conclusions 
about the claimant’s medical impairment(s).”42 
Notwithstanding these authorities, the organized bar has been steadfast 
that disclosing unfavorable information in SSDI proceedings would violate 
attorneys’ obligations to zealously represent their clients and maintain client 
confidences.43  The bar defeated 2005 reforms that would have expressly 
required the production of unfavorable evidence.44  The most recent 
amendments were opposed unsuccessfully on similar grounds even though 
they do not explicitly address adverse evidence.45  In proposing these new 
disclosure rules, the SSA specifically noted that it does not currently 
receive complete evidence from SSDI practitioners.46 
As commentators have noted, the bar’s position that lawyers cannot 
disclose unfavorable evidence in SSDI proceedings is difficult to reconcile 
with state ethics rules.47  Nevertheless, this position appears to reflect the 
views of many practitioners48 and, as recently as 2012, was not contested 
by the SSA.49 
It is difficult to discern how many individuals who receive SSDI are not 
medically impaired and are capable of engaging in remunerative work.  
Nevertheless, there are undoubtedly a substantial number.  Although SSDI 
is not a form of unemployment insurance, SSDI applications increased 27.3 
 
North Carolina ethics opinion replaced an earlier opinion that mandated disclosure without 
explaining the change of position. Rains, supra note 20, at 386. 
 41. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512, 416.912(a) (2015).  For a discussion of the amendment 
and its purpose, see generally Robert W. Pratt, Developing the Record in Disability Cases:  
A Conundrum for Lawyers and Judges, SOC. SEC. NEWS, Spring 2015, at 4, 16. 
 42. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1740(b)(1). 
 43. See Rains, supra note 20, at 380–81. 
 44. See id. at 381–82. 
 45. Pratt, supra note 41, at 4. 
 46. See Submission of Evidence in Disability Claims, 79 Fed. Reg. 9663, 9664 
(proposed Feb. 11, 2014) (to be codified at 20 C.F.R. pts. 404, 405, 416). 
 47. Confidentiality rules are not absolute and allow an exception for compliance with 
federal law. See, e.g., Pratt, supra note 41, at 4, 16; Rains, supra note 20, at 390–91; see also 
Vt. Bar Ass’n, Advisory Ethics Op. 95-08 (1995) (suggesting that a lawyer’s knowing 
concealment of information material to the benefit determination could constitute a fraud on 
the tribunal). 
 48. One prominent firm that represented 200,000 individuals before ODAR from 2001 
to 2010 apparently “red flags” adverse medical evidence so that it is not disclosed to ODAR. 
See Damian Paletta & Dionne Searcey, Two Lawyers Strike Gold in U.S. Disability System, 
WALL STREET J. (Dec. 22, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240529702035 
18404577096632862007046 [http://perma.cc/BM56-334U]. 
 49. In 2012, the SSA Commissioner testified that lawyers were not expected to submit 
adverse evidence to ODAR. See Charles T. Hall, Commissioner Says Attorneys Have No 
Obligation to Submit Adverse Medical Evidence in Social Security Disability Cases, SOC. 
SEC. NEWS (May 23, 2012, 2:45 PM), http://socsecnews.blogspot.com/2012/05/ 
commissioner-says-attorneys-have-no.html [http://perma.cc/YV8W-7S9E]. 
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percent and rewards by 20.3 percent from 2007 to 2009.50  The increase in 
applications and awards from 2007 to 2009 can likely be attributed to the 
economic recession, not rising incidents of medical impairments among 
working Americans.51 
Attorneys who do not disclose adverse evidence undermine the 
adjudication of SSDI claims even if they do not advance fraudulent claims.  
As a long-time ODAR judge has written, 
The purpose of a Social Security Act . . . is to provide assistance for those 
who cannot work due to a medically determinable impairment.  Just as 
with any other welfare program, the goal is to determine eligibility for 
benefits.  The only way to do this is to consider all of the medical and 
vocational information, not just the favorable information.  The goal of 
the Social Security disability programs should not be to reward those who 
cheat or hide evidence the most successfully.52 
The one-sided presentation of evidence at the ODAR stage may also 
explain why claimants are far more likely to prevail in ODAR hearings than 
in other stages of SSA review.53 
Congress could seek to reform the administration of SSDI claims in 
various ways, including by making ODAR hearings adversarial.54  But 
there would be less need for potentially costly reforms that direct monies 
away from beneficiaries if attorneys acknowledged that they had 
responsibilities to the SSDI process as well as their clients.55 
B.  Medicaid Planning 
Medicaid is also being transformed through attorneys’ tactics in 
representing individual clients.  In particular, attorneys’ participation in 
“Medicaid planning” allows middle-class and even upper-class Americans 
to transfer the costs of long-term care to the government.56 
 
 50. See MORTON, supra note 26, at 14–15; see also JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC 
JUSTICE:  MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY CLAIMS 34 (1983) (“The disability 
program could easily turn into a residual unemployment program. . . .  The program thus 
requires very tight administration to maintain its integrity.”). 
 51. See Swank, supra note 21, at 157–58. 
 52. See id. at 171 (footnotes omitted). 
 53. In 2010, for example, 62 percent of claims prevailed in hearings before ODAR 
judges, whereas 35 percent prevailed at the initial level and 13 percent at the reconsideration 
level. See MORTON, supra note 26, at 17–18. 
 54. See generally id. at 22–24 (analyzing proposed congressional reforms). 
 55. See Pratt, supra note 41, at 16.  Even if SSA regulations unambiguously mandated 
disclosure of adverse evidence, it might not change attorney behavior because the SSA has a 
poor record of disciplining representatives who appear before it. See Swank, supra note 21, 
at 173.  Nonattorneys are sanctioned at a higher rate than attorneys. See id.  In addition, 
attorneys and nonattorney representatives can obviate the need for disclosure by simply not 
seeking out information that could potentially undermine their clients’ claims.  David Luban 
describes this phenomenon as “contrived ignorance.” See David Luban, Contrived 
Ignorance, 87 GEO. L.J. 957, 970–71 (1999).  One prominent SSDI firm has already 
mastered this tactic by delegating review of files to staff persons. See Paletta & Searcey, 
supra note 48. 
 56. See generally Timothy L. Takacs & David L. McGuffey, Medicaid Planning:  Can It 
Be Justified?:  Legal and Ethical Implications of Medicaid Planning, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. 
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Medicaid was passed as part of the Social Security Amendments of 
1965.57  It was designed to provide the poor and disabled with basic 
medical care, but is now the primary source of funding for long-term care.58  
Medicaid is administered by the states, although much of its funding 
derives from the federal government.59 
Medicaid eligibility rules are stringent.  Only certain groups—such as the 
disabled, elderly, and parents and their children—are able to claim 
benefits.60  Income requirements are also very low, especially in states that 
have refused to participate in the PPACA’s Medicaid expansion.61  For 
example, to be eligible for Medicaid, parents must earn less than $27,310 in 
states that have accepted the expansion and less than $9103 in states that 
have not.62 
Many elderly Americans rely on Medicaid to pay for their long-term 
health needs because Medicare generally only pays for acute, short-term 
care,63 and long-term care is prohibitively expensive.64  The Kaiser 
Foundation estimated that the median cost of a year of home health aide 
services was $45,800 a year in 2014, and nursing home care was $91,250.65  
 
REV. 111, 131 (2002) (“Effective Medicaid planning guides the applicant through the 
minefield of potential ineligibility.  The effective Medicaid planner helps an applicant 
preserve assets, while fitting within the financial criteria for Medicaid eligibility.”). 
 57. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, tit. XIX, 79 Stat. 286, 
343–53 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396–1396w-5 (2012)). 
 58. See John M. Broderick, To Transfer or Not to Transfer:  Congress Failed to Stiffen 
Penalties for Medicaid Estate Planning, but Should the Practice Continue?, 6 ELDER L.J. 
257, 260 (1998).  In 2013, Medicaid was responsible for 51 percent of total American 
spending on long-term care. See ERICA L. REAVES & MARYBETH MUSUMECI, KAISER 
COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND UNINSURED, MEDICAID AND LONG-TERM SERVICES AND 
SUPPORTS:  A PRIMER 4 fig.3 (2015), https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/ 
2015/12/8617-02-medicaid-and-long-term-services-and-supports-a-primer.pdf [http://perma. 
cc/4FGY-WK4K]. 
 59. See Takacs & McGuffey, supra note 56, at 123.  The federal government pays a 
fixed percentage of what the state pays, with poorer states receiving a higher percentage. See 
CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, POLICY BASICS:  INTRODUCTION TO MEDICAID 4 
(2015), http://www.cbpp.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/policybasics-medicaid_0.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/L4PJ-R3C4]. 
 60. See Roger A. McEowen & Neil E. Harl, Estate Planning for the Elderly and 
Disabled:  Organizing the Estate to Qualify for Federal Medicaid Extended Care Assistance, 
24 IND. L. REV. 1379, 1381 n.14 (1991). 
 61. See JULIA PARADISE, KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, MEDICAID 
MOVING FORWARD 2 (2015), http://files.kff.org/attachment/issue-brief-medicaid-moving-
forward [http://perma.cc/6WBV-TS6C]. 
 62. Id. at 3 fig.4. 
 63. See REAVES & MUSUMECI, supra note 58, at 3. 
 64. See id. at 3–4.  The elderly represent less than 10 percent of Medicaid enrollees but 
are responsible for over a fifth of its total cost. See PARADISE, supra note 61, at 2 fig.2.  
These costs are likely to grow significantly as the population ages.  Indeed, by 2050, one-
fifth of the U.S. population will be over sixty-five, and a third of these individuals will have 
cognitive or functional limitations that will require long-term care. See CONG. BUDGET 
OFFICE, RISING DEMAND FOR LONG-TERM SERVICES AND SUPPORTS FOR ELDERLY PEOPLE 1 
(2013), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/113th-congress-2013-2014/reports/44363-
LTC.pdf [http://perma.cc/EHY4-PAQG]. 
 65. REAVES & MUSUMECI, supra note 58, at 3. 
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Even individuals who can afford such sums may prefer to shift the cost onto 
the government to preserve their wealth for their heirs.66 
The federal government has sought to prevent individuals from 
voluntarily impoverishing themselves in order to qualify for Medicaid.  
With some exceptions, any transfers of assets for less than fair market value 
within three years of the Medicaid application renders the transferor 
ineligible for Medicaid.67  Any transfers to a trust within five years of the 
application also make the transferor ineligible.68 
Lawyers have nevertheless devised numerous financial impoverishment 
techniques to allow clients to preserve wealth and qualify for Medicaid.  
They include having clients make gifts or transfers prior to the relevant 
“look-back” period, converting countable assets to noncountable assets, and 
prepaying for future expenses.69  Some lawyers even counsel divorce as a 
Medicaid planning strategy, with the spouse in need of care receiving 
virtually none of the couple’s property.70 
Lawyers are often reluctant to discuss Medicaid planning and their role 
therein.71  But Congress was sufficiently concerned about the practice that 
it criminalized Medicaid-related asset transfers in 1996.72  The law, which 
came to be known as the “Granny Goes to Jail Act,” was quickly repealed 
in the face of fierce public opposition.73  A subsequent effort to criminalize 
the counseling of Medicaid planning was also stymied after the New York 
State Bar Association successfully enjoined its enforcement on First 
Amendment grounds.74 
That Congress has been unable to prohibit Medicaid planning does not 
signify that all Medicaid planning strategies are ethical.  Some strategies are 
clearly prohibited by existing ethics rules.  For example, attorneys who 
backdate transfers of assets so that they occur outside of the “look-back” 
 
 66. An added complication is that wealth preservation may be in the best interests of a 
client’s potential heirs but not of the client.  For a useful discussion of the conflicts of 
interest that can arise in this context, see David M. Rosenfeld, Whose Decision Is It 
Anyway?:  Identifying the Medicaid Planning Client, 6 ELDER L.J. 383, 389–93 (1998). 
 67. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1)(B) (2012). 
 68. Id. 
 69. See Miller, supra note 22, at 93–95.  An example of converting countable assets to 
noncountable assets would be to use cash to make home improvements because “household 
goods” and “personal effects” are not counted as resources for Medicaid purposes. See 42 
U.S.C. § 1382b(a)(2)(A). 
 70. See Miller, supra note 22, at 96. 
 71. See generally Takacs & McGuffey, supra note 56, at 134–35 (“Many elder law 
attorneys are sensitive about the public image associated with Medicaid planning.  Medicaid 
planners are often accused of ‘gaming the system’ for their undeserving and overprivileged 
clients.”). 
 72. See Joire, supra note 23, at 801 (citing the court’s discussion of former 42 U.S.C. § 
1320a-7b(a)(6) in New York State Bar Ass’n v. Reno, 999 F. Supp. 710, 712 (N.D.N.Y. 
1998)). 
 73. See id. at 801–02. 
 74. N.Y. State Bar Ass’n, 999 F. Supp. at 715 (enjoining the enforcement of current 42 
U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(a)(6)). 
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period engage in fraud and can be disbarred.75  In addition, because elderly 
persons are not infrequently suffering from some form of diminished 
capacity, attorneys should not assist with Medicaid planning when it is not 
truly sought by their clients and is being urged by potential heirs.76 
Even strategies that do not run afoul of current ethics rules may be 
unethical.  Americans do not have a right to Medicaid benefits, and it is 
unclear why attorneys should be able to assist clients to engage in 
transactions that have no purpose other than Medicaid qualification.77  
Indeed, lawyers have been found criminally liable for executing 
substanceless transactions in the tax and securities contexts.78  That these 
lawyers aided their clients in masking liabilities as opposed to claiming 
benefits should be irrelevant.79 
Medicaid planning is nevertheless commonplace.  Studies estimate that 
anywhere from 5 percent to 54 percent of current Medicaid beneficiaries 
have engaged in Medicaid planning.80  Even if the lower estimates are 
accurate, as Medicaid planning is generally used by more affluent 
individuals, it predominantly benefits the nonpoor.81  As with SSDI, 
 
 75. See Toledo Bar Ass’n v. Cook, 868 N.E.2d 973, 978–81 (Ohio 2007) (upholding the 
disbarment of an Ohio attorney who backdated a deed that transferred ownership of a farm to 
qualify a client for Medicaid). 
 76. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.14 cmt. 3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013); 
Katherine C. Pearson, The Lawyer’s Ethical Considerations in Medicaid Planning for the 
Elderly:  Representing Smith and Jones, 76 PA. B. ASS’N Q. 1, 9 (2005). 
 77. See Jeffery L. Soltermann, Medicaid and the Middle Class:  Should the Government 
Pay for Everyone’s Long-Term Health Care?, 1 ELDER L.J. 251, 277 (1993) (“Medicaid is 
not an earned benefit, transferred at the end of one’s productive life by a grateful state.  It is 
instead a need-based poverty program.”).  Because of the limited resources of state Medicaid 
agencies, Medicaid-related transfers often go undetected.  As the Government 
Accountability Office has documented, only twenty-four states require documentation of 
current and historical financial and investment resources. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, MEDICAID LONG-TERM CARE:  INFORMATION OBTAINED BY STATES ABOUT 
APPLICANTS’ ASSETS VARIES AND MAY BE INSUFFICIENT 13 (2012), http://www.gao.gov/ 
assets/600/593053.pdf [http://perma.cc/73ZG-3Y5U]. 
 78. For example, the Dallas law firm of Jenkins & Gilchrist designed tax shelters using 
options on currency exchanges that would never be triggered but nevertheless were booked 
as losses to offset capital gains. See TANINA ROSTAIN & MILTON C. REGAN, JR., CONFIDENCE 
GAMES:  LAWYERS, ACCOUNTANTS, AND THE TAX SHELTER INDUSTRY 194–96 (2014).  The 
law firm paid a $76 million fine to the IRS for aiding and abetting tax fraud and then closed. 
See Press Release, IRS, Jenkens & Gilchrist Admits It Is Subject to $76 Million IRS Penalty 
(Mar. 29, 2007), https://www.irs.gov/uac/Jenkens-&-Gilchrist-Admits-It-Is-Subject-to-$76-
Million-IRS-Penalty [http://perma.cc/27EC-TGF9].  Similarly, a lawyer for Refco, a 
bankrupt financial services company, was found guilty of securities and wire fraud for 
preparing documents for transfers between Refco entities during accounting review periods 
so that Refco could mask its indebtedness. See Sung Hui Kim, Naked Self-Interest?:  Why 
the Legal Profession Resists Gatekeeping, 63 FLA. L. REV. 129, 129–30 (2011). 
 79. Individuals seeking Medicaid benefits may be more sympathetic than large financial 
institutions and wealthy individuals, but attorneys’ ethical responsibilities should not be 
contingent on subjective notions of desert. 
 80. See Jinkook Lee, Medicaid and Family Wealth Transfer, 46 GERONTOLOGIST 6, 8 
(2006).  A particular difficulty in assessing Medicaid planning’s prevalence is that planning 
techniques vary widely and beneficiaries are understandably reluctant to discuss it. See id. at 
12. 
 81. See id. at 9; see also Soltermann, supra note 77, at 276–77 (“[A] major piece of 
social engineering—the conversion of a need-based program [like Medicaid] for the poor to 
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lawyers have made a limited and circumscribed government program far 
more expansive than it was intended to be. 
II.  THE MACROETHICS OF SSDI AND MEDICAID LAWYERS 
This Article has thus far described the controversy over lawyers’ 
nondisclosure of adverse evidence in SSDI proceedings and participation in 
Medicaid planning without categorically condemning these practices.  
Whether nondisclosure and Medicaid planning are ethical will naturally 
depend on the circumstances.  Assessing a client’s disability and financial 
status also inevitably involves a great deal of subjectivity,82 and attorneys 
are generally entitled to take “whatever lawful and ethical measures are 
required to vindicate a client’s cause or endeavor.”83 
One can conceive of uncontroversial examples of nondisclosure and 
Medicaid planning.  Indeed, as one state bar association has suggested, an 
attorney should not be forced to disclose a medical opinion that questions 
the severity of his or her client’s impairment when the doctor performing it 
lacked the necessary qualifications and there is other very reliable evidence 
of impairment.84  Under these circumstances, the opinion would not be 
material to a disability determination, and ODAR would be able to make an 
informed decision without it.85  Moreover, lawyers should obviously be 
entitled to advise clients on the nuances of Medicaid eligibility, which 
would include informing clients that converting cash into household items 
or transferring assets to needy children would not disqualify one from 
receiving Medicaid.86 
However, credible reports suggest that lawyers are reluctant to disclose 
even reliable evidence in SSDI cases and may assist with aggressive forms 
of Medicaid planning.87  The organized bar’s vigorous defense of 
nondisclosure and Medicaid planning, and its defeat of administrative and 
 
a more universal entitlement program—is underway in this country, and lawyers are 
inevitably involved.”). 
 82. See generally Alice G. Abreu & Richard K. Greenstein, Defining Income, 11 FLA. 
TAX REV. 295, 320 (2011) (“Some realized accessions over which the taxpayer has dominion 
are income, others are not taxed despite the absence of a statutory or even administratively 
stated exclusion . . . .”); Matthew Diller, Entitlement and Exclusion:  The Role of Disability 
in the Social Welfare System, 44 UCLA L. REV. 361, 386 (1996) (“[D]isabilty is not an 
objective status . . . .  Virtually all individuals are capable of some form of productive 
activity. . . .  [T]he establishment of eligibility criteria and the assessment of whether those 
criteria are met require reference to a normative view of the nature and intensity of the 
obligation to work.”). 
 83. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.3 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013). 
 84. See Vt. Bar Ass’n, Advisory Ethics Op. 95-08 (1995). 
 85. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3(d). 
 86. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1382b(a)(2)(A), (c)(1)(C)(ii)(III) (2012).  Ethical rules also 
prohibit lawyers from counseling or assisting fraud but not from advising clients as to the 
consequences of potential courses of conduct. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2 
cmt. 9. 
 87. See Mary Beth Franklin, The Crackdown on Medicaid Planning, KIPLINGER (Nov. 
2007), http://www.kiplinger.com/article/insurance/T037-C000-S002-the-crackdown-on-
medicaid-planning.html#b5dRZpFZu4Fcj9b2.99 [http://perma.cc/WB7Z-EG8H]; Paletta & 
Searcey, supra note 48. 
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legislative initiatives to curtail them, mean that lawyers have little to fear 
for continuing to engage in these practices.  Furthermore, with relatively 
low fees earned on a per matter basis and substantial competition for SSDI 
and Medicaid work, few attorneys will wish to alienate potentially fee-
paying clients by engaging (or failing to engage) in any actions that could 
interfere with their clients’ ability to claim SSDI or Medicaid benefits.88 
The nondisclosure of adverse evidence and participation in Medicaid 
planning nevertheless impose significant costs on the United States.  First 
and most obvious, the cost to taxpayers is substantial when claimants 
receive yearly SSDI and Medicaid benefits that they likely would not have 
been awarded but for their lawyers’ use of strategies to circumvent 
eligibility criteria. 
Second, SSDI and Medicaid claimants who do meet eligibility criteria are 
harmed when individuals who are not medically impaired or financially 
impoverished receive benefits.  The funding for SSDI and Medicaid is 
limited.89  Benefits to individuals who do not meet eligibility criteria 
deplete the funds available to intended beneficiaries.  Of equal concern is 
that those who are in most need of assistance will face skepticism and delay 
as administrators attempt to weed out undeserving claimants.90  Some may 
even be denied benefits if they attempt to navigate these systems without 
experienced counsel. 
Third, the future funding of SSDI and Medicaid is jeopardized when the 
public perceives that claimants and their lawyers are exploiting these 
 
 88. The federal government caps representatives’ fees in SSDI cases to either 25 percent 
of the past-due benefits or $6000, whichever is lower. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1730(b) (2015); 
Maximum Dollar Limit in the Fee Amount Process, 74 Fed. Reg. 6080 (Jan. 29, 2009).  
While fee information for Medicaid planning is not as readily available, according to the 
American Counsel of Aging, attorneys’ fees can range from $2500 for individuals with 
relatively simple estates to $10,000 for individuals with significant assets. See Am. Council 
on Aging, Medicaid Planners:  Pros & Cons of Public and Private Assistance, MEDICAID 
PLANNING ASSISTANCE, http://www.medicaidplanningassistance.org/types-of-medicaid-
planners#elderlaw-attorney (last visited Mar. 27, 2016) [http://perma.cc/EJ5L-2RWR].  
Nonlawyers who provide Medicaid planning services generally charge less. Id. 
 89. The SSDI fund was on pace to be insolvent by 2016. See, e.g., Jason J. Fichtner, 
Social Security Disability Fund Will Run Empty Next Year, MARKETWATCH (Apr. 3, 2015, 
10:43 AM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/social-security-disability-fund-will-run-
empty-next-year-2015-04-03 [http://perma.cc/D93F-L7DX].  Government expenditures for 
long-term care are expected to comprise 3.3 percent of the GDP by 2050. See CONG. BUDGET 
OFFICE, supra note 64, at 4. 
 90. This is not merely a theoretical concern.  To avert SSDI’s insolvency and drastic 
cuts to beneficiaries, Congress recently reallocated benefits from the general social security 
fund to SSDI and, in so doing, required that DDS review of SSDI applications include 
reviews from doctors and psychologists, which is likely to lead to greater delays in 
processing applications. See Robert Pear, Agreement Is Seen As Short-Term Relief for 
Medicare and Social Security, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2015/10/28/us/agreement-is-seen-as-short-term-relief-for-medicare-and-social-security. 
html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/SMG9-9P5C].  As Professor Mashaw observes, efforts to reduce 
false positives (i.e., awards to applicants who do not meet eligibility criteria) will necessarily 
increase the number of false negatives (i.e., denials to applicants who do). MASHAW, supra 
note 50, at 84–85; see also id. at 129 (questioning whether the pursuit of best available 
evidence justifies the cost in terms of delay and administrative expenses). 
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programs.  Both programs are frequently attacked on this basis.91  If these 
attacks gain sufficient traction, political leaders may scale back these—and 
potentially other—programs that constitute the fragile American social 
safety net. 
Fourth, even if these programs are not dramatically altered, the ability of 
comparatively advantaged individuals to qualify for SSDI and Medicaid 
may imperil progressive reforms of these programs.92  There is likely to be 
no political impetus for formally loosening eligibility criteria when 
attorneys can qualify individuals for benefits who are neither severely 
impaired nor poor.93  This disproportionately harms individuals who may 
be in genuine need but mistakenly believe that only the truly disabled and 
impoverished are able to receive benefits. 
Defenders of these practices may argue that attorneys should be 
unconcerned with such considerations because their only obligations are to 
their clients.94  Nevertheless, while “undiluted partisanship” on the client’s 
behalf may be required in criminal defense and perhaps other adversarial 
contexts, lawyers should conceive of their roles differently when they 
 
 91. See, e.g., Jillian Kay Melchior, SSA Scandal:  Outrageous Judges Rubber-Stamp 
Disability Benefits to the Undeserving, NAT’L REV. (June 12, 2014, 4:00 AM), 
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/380168/ssa-scandal-jillian-kay-melchior 
[http://perma.cc/BA2M-KECL]; Diana Conway, My Turn:  Cheating Uncle Sam for Mom & 
Dad, NEWSWEEK (Jan. 27, 2003), http://www.elderlawnewyork.com/pdf/My-Turn-Cheating-
Uncle-Sam-Mom-Dad.pdf [https://perma.cc/H27F-7M2L]. 
 92. Professor Fred Zacharias has questioned the notion that lawyers will work in support 
of substantive progressive ideals. See Fred C. Zacharias, True Confessions About the Role of 
Lawyers in a Democracy, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1591, 1592 (2009).  In his view, lawyers’ 
devotion to clients’ interests prevents them from promoting societal values. See id. at 1599. 
 93. The political preferences of low- and middle-class individuals are rarely translated 
into policy unless those views mirror those of wealthier individuals. See generally Benjamin 
I. Sachs, The Unbundled Union:  Politics Without Collective Bargaining, 123 YALE L.J. 148, 
150 (2013) (“[T]he poor and middle class have a major political problem today.  The 
problem is that the government is strikingly unresponsive to their views.”). 
 94. As commentators have observed, American lawyers largely have internalized Lord 
Brougham’s belief that the attorney’s only duty is to his or her client. See, e.g., Russell G. 
Pearce, Lawyers As America’s Governing Class:  The Formation and Dissolution of the 
Original Understanding of the American Lawyer’s Role, 8 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 381, 
407–10 (2001) (reviewing empirical literature on the rise of the “hired gun” conception as 
the dominant ideology among U.S. lawyers); Thomas L. Shaffer, The Unique, Novel, and 
Unsound Adversary Ethic, 41 VAND. L. REV. 697, 697 (1988); see also Eli Wald, Resizing 
the Rules of Professional Conduct, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 227, 266 (2014) (criticizing the 
“hired gun” basis of the Model Rules).  Lord Brougham famously declared, while defending 
Queen Caroline from charges of adultery, that 
an advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all the world, 
and that person is his client.  To save that client by all means and expedients, and 
at all hazards and costs to other persons, and, among them, to himself, is his first 
and only duty; and in performing this duty he must not regard the alarm, the 
torments, the destruction which he may bring upon others.  Separating the duty of 
a patriot from that of advocate, he must go on reckless of consequences, though it 
should be his unhappy fate to involve his country in confusion. 
2 THE WHOLE PROCEEDINGS ON THE TRIAL OF HER MAJESTY, CAROLINE AMELIA ELIZABETH, 
QUEEN OF ENGLAND 2 (John Fairburn ed., 1820). 
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represent clients asserting claims on limited pools of government funds.95  
To restrict the secret welfare state’s growth, lawyers must be willing to act 
as gatekeepers of public benefits programs. 
III.  ATTORNEYS AS PUBLIC BENEFITS GATEKEEPERS 
An attorney is a “representative of clients, an officer of the legal 
system[,] and a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of 
justice.”96  These roles sometimes conflict.97  But lawyers qua 
representatives are not obligated to use all arguably lawful means to enable 
their SSDI and Medicaid clients to receive benefits.98  Lawyers can, 
consistent with their ethical obligations, act as gatekeepers of Medicaid, 
SSDI, and other public benefits programs. 
Contemporary ethics rules require lawyers zealously to pursue only their 
clients’ “legitimate interests.”99  Clients who do not qualify for SSDI and 
Medicaid do not have a legitimate interest in receiving benefits.  Even with 
respect to clients who do have cognizable claims to benefits, lawyers are 
not “bound . . . to press for every advantage.”100  They must also “avoid 
conduct that undermines the integrity of the adjudicative process.”101  
When lawyers refuse to disclose adverse evidence in SSDI proceedings or 
to assist with Medicaid planning, they are choosing to privilege their 
clients’ claims over other societal interests. 
Undiluted partisanship on the client’s behalf is especially unwarranted 
because of the nonadversarial nature of the SSDI and Medicaid regimes.102  
 
 95. Professor Tanina Rostain has claimed that “undiluted partisanship remain[s] the 
default orientation of lawyering.” Tanina Rostain, Ethics Lost:  Limitations of Current 
Approaches to Lawyer Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 1273, 1278 (1998).  Even scholars 
who have been harshly critical of the partisanship ethos view it as justified in the criminal 
defense context. See, e.g., David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. 
REV. 1729, 1730 (1993); W. Bradley Wendel, Public Values and Professional 
Responsibility, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 48 (1999) (“Arguments for a strong adversarial 
ethic of loyalty in cases where an isolated individual is overwhelmed by the power of the 
state become distorted when they are applied in other contexts.”). 
 96. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013). 
 97. See, e.g., Rostain, supra note 95, at 1278; Wald, supra note 94, at 266. 
 98. The notion that lawyers should only be committed to their clients’ interests was 
regarded as “monstrous” for much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. See Michael 
Ariens, Brougham’s Cost, 35 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 263, 281–96 (2015).  The ethic was adopted 
by the organized bar as part of an effort to improve the quality of criminal defense. See id. at 
307–08.  According to Professor Arians, it quickly gained traction among American lawyers 
generally because it served their material interests. See id. at 314.  He also credits Professor 
Freedman for bringing about this shift. See id. at 309. 
 99. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. (emphasis added). 
 100. Id. r. 1.3 cmt. 1; see also Wald, supra note 94, at 250 (“[A]llowing lawyers to act as 
unchecked client-centered representatives exposes the legal system and the public to abuse 
by clients.”). 
 101. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.3 cmt. 2. 
 102. For attorneys’ duties in nonadversarial proceedings, see id. r. 3.3 cmt. 14; MODEL 
CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-15 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980) (“[W]here the applicable 
rules of the agency impose specific obligations upon a lawyer, it is his duty to comply 
therewith . . . .”); id. at EC 7-15 n.25 (“But as an advocate before a service which itself 
represents the adversary point of view, where his client’s case is fairly arguable, a lawyer is 
under no duty to disclose its weaknesses . . . .” (citing ABA Op. 314 (1965))). 
1860 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84 
The government has no interest in having valid SSDI and Medicaid claims 
go unpaid.103  Nor does it employ individuals to advocate against 
claimants.104  Consequently, when lawyers fail to disclose adverse evidence 
or use techniques that make their clients appear financially impoverished, 
the SSA and state Medicaid agencies are unable to readily differentiate 
deserving from undeserving claimants.  Individual instances of 
nondisclosure of adverse evidence and Medicaid planning may have a 
minimal effect on the solvency of SSDI and Medicaid; collectively, they 
threaten the future of these programs and the welfare of those who depend 
on them.105 
Of course, many SSDI and Medicaid clients are sympathetic individuals, 
and eligibility criteria for SSDI and Medicaid are quite stringent.  Lawyers 
can and should advocate for different eligibility rules.  However, it does not 
follow that lawyers should routinely assist clients to circumvent eligibility 
criteria until such a time as these programs are reformed.106  Lawyers are 
not ethically required to advance all nonfrivolous claims to SSDI and 
Medicaid benefits.107 
Indeed, rather than focusing their efforts on circumvention, lawyers could 
advise clients with weak SSDI and Medicaid claims of alternate sources of 
assistance.  Advising clients on their available options is a core attorney 
function.108  Individuals who are struggling to find work might be entitled 
to unemployment insurance and benefits under the Temporary Assistance 
for Needy Families program.109  Elderly clients should be urged to purchase 
long-term care insurance, which may be less expensive than paying for 
Medicaid planning services.110  It should not be assumed that clients have 
no alternatives besides seeking SSDI and Medicaid. 
Although the lawyer qua zealous advocate is a more familiar archetype, 
lawyers are expected to serve as gatekeepers and push back against their 
 
 103. See MASHAW, supra note 50, at 81. 
 104. See id. 
 105. Professor Luban has written of “collectively harmful actions” that are wrong by 
virtue of their collectively harmful character even if they are not individually harmful. See 
David Luban, The Social Responsibilities of Lawyers:  A Green Perspective, 63 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 955, 963 (1995).  Examples of permissible nondisclosure of adverse evidence and 
Medicaid planning that were discussed in Part I would be “collectively harmful.” 
 106. In fact, as noted in Part II, such action makes it less likely that these programs will 
be made more generous in the future. 
 107. See Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983).  Lawyers are prohibited only from 
bringing claims for which “there is [no] basis in law and fact for doing so that is not 
frivolous.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013). 
 108. See id. r. 2.1. 
 109. Unemployment compensation is run jointly by the federal government and 
individual states. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 603–616 (2015).  The provisions of the Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families program are found in 45 C.F.R. §§ 260–284 (2015). 
 110. Long-term care insurance is readily available but currently covers only 7.2 percent 
of the United States’s long-term care expenses. See Peter Kyle, Confronting the Elder Care 
Crisis:  The Private Long-Term Care Insurance Market and the Utility of Hybrid Products, 
15 MARQ. ELDER’S ADVISOR 101, 106 (2013). 
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clients’ misguided objectives.111  As Professor Zacharias has written, 
“[T]he lawyer’s job consists as much of standing in the way of misguided 
client pursuits as of implementing client desires.  No one except misguided 
practitioners and cynical criminal clients truly envision the lawyer’s role as 
assisting wrongful ends.”112 
Attorney gatekeeping is especially embedded in tax law.113  Because 
taxpayers wish to minimize their tax burdens whereas the government 
needs tax revenue to operate, lawyers and other tax practitioners are 
expected to ensure that their clients pay what they owe.114  Federal law 
prohibits tax practitioners from taking positions to lower their clients’ 
payment obligations unless there is “substantial authority” for that 
position.115  With respect to the use of tax shelters, which were widely 
abused by high net worth individuals in the mid-1990s, the law now 
requires that a lawyer reasonably believe that the position is more likely 
than not to be sustained on the merits.116 
The tax bar largely supported legislative and regulatory efforts that 
formalized tax lawyers’ gatekeeping responsibilities.117  The rise of the tax 
shelter industry led tax lawyers to realize that the single-minded pursuit of 
client interests undermined their standing and the value of professional 
expertise: 
As the market for tax shelters expanded, the path of least resistance was to 
participate.  In the confines of their private offices, tax lawyers felt 
intense pressure to provide clients with opinions on questionable 
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transactions.  The activities of the organized bar offered a space for the 
same lawyers collectively to resist these pressures.118 
SSDI and Medicaid lawyers operate under many of the same competitive 
pressures as tax lawyers, and their actions also have a significant effect on 
the fiscal health of the United States.  Yet neither lawyers who practice in 
these areas nor the organized bar have meaningfully addressed how lawyers 
can effectively represent their clients while averting a tragedy of the 
commons with respect to these public benefits programs.119 
Lawyers may be unwilling to disclose adverse evidence in SSDI 
proceedings and to refrain from participation in Medicaid planning given 
that past legislative and administrative efforts to address these practices 
have failed.120  Moreover, effective gatekeeping requires more than 
committing to not withholding information and to not using certain 
Medicaid planning strategies.121  Lawyers must inform themselves about 
their client’s situations so that they do not qualify clients for SSDI and 
Medicaid who are not medically impaired or financially impoverished and 
so that they may advise on alternatives. 
One means to diminish the secret welfare state would be for the SSA and 
state Medicaid agencies to require lawyers to certify that, based on their 
review of the relevant client materials, there is a reasonable basis to believe 
that their clients qualify for benefits.  This is in effect the operative regime 
in tax law.122  Lawyers would make such certifications after reviewing their 
clients’ work and medical histories for SSDI claims, and years of income 
and asset information for Medicaid claims.  Lawyers who certify claims 
that do not have a reasonable basis would be subject to sanction.123 
This proposal, if adopted, would not inhibit lawyers from representing 
SSDI clients with controvertible claims.  Nor would it eliminate all forms of 
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Medicaid planning.124  However, in recognition of the nonadversarial 
nature of SSDI and Medicaid processes, attorneys would no longer be able 
to advance all nonfrivolous claims to benefits and would also have to 
conduct a sufficient investigation to assess their clients’ claims.125  A 
certification requirement would also not infringe upon attorney-client 
confidentiality because lawyers would not be required to disclose any client 
information to either the SSA or state Medicaid agencies.126 
The SSA and state Medicaid agencies may not possess the statutory 
authority to regulate attorney conduct in this manner.127  Many attorneys 
would also oppose any effort to increase their investigative burdens and to 
subject them to discipline for advancing nonfrivolous claims.  Nevertheless, 
lawyers routinely opine on the legal soundness of their clients’ positions in 
transactional contexts.128  These opinions must be based on a transaction’s 
specific facts and are expected to draw reasonable legal conclusions.129 
An alternative to mandatory certification is a voluntary certification 
regime.  A voluntary regime would likely not require legislative action and 
would presumably be more palatable to the organized bar.  Administrative 
agencies would also be justified in subjecting certified claims to expedited 
and less exacting review.130  Lawyers would, of course, be required to 
communicate fully the implications of certification to their clients so that 
they would be able to decide whether to have their claims certified.131 
When representing clients before benefit-granting agencies, lawyers 
would ideally advocate for their clients while acknowledging weaknesses in 
their claims.  However, such an ethical posture is weakly supported by the 
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organized bar132 and is largely foreign to SSDI and Medicaid practice.  To 
ensure that benefit lawyers fulfill their gatekeeping function, the 
government could require or exhort attorneys to certify their clients’ 
claims.133 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has contended that lawyers have created a secret welfare 
state through their use of controversial tactics in the representation of SSDI 
and Medicaid clients.  Although the nondisclosure of adverse information in 
SSDI proceedings and participation in Medicaid planning may be ethical in 
certain situations, these tactics have transformed and expanded these public 
benefits programs.  Future research should examine the impact of lawyering 
on other public benefit programs.  The limited nature of the American 
welfare state may have created high demand for benefit lawyers who are 
willing to use aggressive and possibly unethical tactics to circumvent 
eligibility criteria. 
The organized bar has opposed the government’s efforts to require 
attorneys to disclose adverse evidence and curtail Medicaid planning out of 
a concern for the attorney-client relationship.  However, as this Article has 
sought to argue, lawyers’ duties to their clients do not obligate them to 
subvert the SSDI and Medicaid processes.  The government’s past reform 
efforts—heavy-handed though they may have been—would have ideally 
spurred a debate within the profession as to how attorneys can effectively 
represent SSDI and Medicaid clients without engaging in actions that 
undermine these benefits programs. 
The SSA and state Medicaid agencies do not exist to deny benefits to 
needy Americans.  Nor do they advocate against claimants.  If attorneys 
focus solely on qualifying clients for benefits, they risk the long-term future 
of SSDI and Medicaid.  Indeed, to ensure the sustainability of these 
programs, lawyers should not merely avoid actions that undermine these 
programs but also conceive of themselves as these programs’ gatekeepers.  
In this capacity, attorneys can advance and advocate for cognizable claims 
while refraining from tactics that impede administrators’ demarcation of 
meritorious claims from nonmeritorious ones. 
Because of the partisanship of American lawyers and the competitive 
pressures of SSDI and Medicaid practice, lawyers are unlikely to embrace a 
gatekeeping role.  Nevertheless, lawyers have gatekeeping responsibilities 
in a number of different areas, including analogous areas such as tax. 
The American welfare state is sustaining relatively advantaged 
individuals and their lawyers as well as the truly needy.  In the long-term, 
the United States would be well served by a more transparent public 
benefits regime.  However, as long as attorneys remain integral, the SSA 
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and state Medicaid agencies need not countenance lawyers who conceive of 
their role solely in terms of facilitating access to benefits. 
